ABSTRACT
Edmund Husserl speaks with high praise of Bergmann's Fundamental Problems of Logic. The empirical tendency so prominent in the logic of the time, with empirical psychology used for the foundation of logic, is foreign to Bergmann, and Husserl regards it as no mean merit that Bergmann holds to the idea of a pure logic as an a priori discipline. Husserl concurs with Bergmann's refusal to restrict logic to mere non-contradiction or "formal truth" to the exclusion of material and real truth, involving agreement with the object. According to Husserl's conception, as already indicated, the idea of norms is originally foreign to the laws of logic. The extension of the normative and practical logic beyond the sphere of its "applications" to definite cognitive contents, its extension to scientific methodology, e.g., necessarily suspends its exclusively a priori character. Bergmann's discussion of the relations of logic and metaphysics leads Husserl to give an interesting statement of his own views.
