ABSTRACT
Soviet analysts were clearly disturbed by the announcement of the strategy of limited nuclear options (LNO) as an important part of the proposed Schlesinger doctrine, because it signaled the possibility of the very kind of "dangerous reversal" in US strategic doctrine that the Soviets had long feared might take place. Between the time of Schlesingers initial statements on LNO in January 197411 and the first comprehensive response to LNO in the Soviet press in November 1974, there was an unusually long pause, during which there was little real attempt at serious public analysis of LNO. Although the anxiety evidenced in the Soviet reaction to the LNO strategy provided some promising clues to the kind of US doctrine that would best strengthen the national security. It would have been exceedingly trite to say that all the United States need have done was declare that the LNO strategy was part of US strategic doctrine and its problems were essentially solved.
