ABSTRACT
At the core of contemporary controversy in statistical theory is the following question: What bearing, if any, has the rarity of an observable occurrence as prescribed by an appropriate stochastic hypothesis on social scientist's legitimate grounds for accepting or rejecting the latter when philosophers have already witnessed the former? At the outset, it will forestall misunderstanding if scientists concede that some contemporary writers use the term statistical inference in a wider sense than as defined, embracing any sort of reasoning which takes within its scope considerations referable to a calculus of probability. It suffices to speak of the engineer’s rule as a rule of statistical prudence; but scientists may reasonably conclude that the theoretical statistician means something more than this when R. A. Fisher uses a form of words so portentous as statistical inference. Some contemporary writers pinpoint a distinction by using the term conditional, in contradistinction to unconditional, inference for what scientists refer to as statistical prudence.
