ABSTRACT
This introduction presents an overview of key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. This book discusses how to explain the truth of true propositions. It presents the problem of negative existential propositions. Truthmaker maximalism allows to rule out the problematic metaphysical commitments. The book argues that the truthmaker maximalist must locate truthmakers for the truths, and that it is hard to see what entity will do the necessary truthmaking work. Within the wider literature, Molnar's work has been central to this discussion. The book presents arguments against both maximalism and the truthmaker relation. It describes reified absences as elements of a negative ontology. The book suggests that a deflationary account of truth can be used to explain the truth of true propositions. It proposes the explanationist model that enables the presentist to solve some of the problems that they have been alleged to face in the metaphysics of time.
