ABSTRACT
Both Priest and Beall offer people an account of negative ontology. Strictly speaking, it is not entirely clear whether or not Priest and Beall offer people a negative ontology that makes recourse to negative properties. Priest and Beall offer them 'polarities' as constituents of facts and, as people shall see in a moment, it is not entirely clear whether polarities are to be treated as properties. Barker and Jago offer a novel defence of negative facts and negative properties (though it seems to overlap quite substantially with views developed and defended in Brownstein). The proposal due to Barker and Jago builds upon an Armstrongian account of states of affairs. As is already familiar, for Armstrong a state of affairs is an entity constituted by a thin particular and a property. Non-mereological relations of the kind posited by Armstrong, when he talks of 'instantiation', are the kinds of relation that generate states of affairs.
