ABSTRACT
In response to the cultural tide toward what I will term STEM(B)—where the (B) stands for the business logic that underwrites much of the social priorities of STEM—I argue that philosophers must demonstrate that recognizing the realities of indeterminacy that attend our epistemic commitments, as well as the questions that are intrinsic to our existential condition, do not lead to a wishy-washy life of compromise, but instead can invite us to an even more compelling manifestation of determination, albeit of a virtuously humbled sort, in our beliefs and actions. My basic thesis is that confidence can be had without certainty when we distinguish between existential determination and epistemic determinacy. When philosophy attempts to defend its relevance on the terms of those that would argue for its demise, then the thing being defended is no longer rightly viewed as “philosophy,” but instead merely as another turn in the cultural assumptions underwritten by a corporate logic that reinforces scientistic objectivism. I will begin by offering a personal engagement with my own identity as a philosopher, and as a teacher, in order to show how the longing for certainty can function as an obstacle to genuine philosophical existence. Then, in the attempt to challenge the logic of objective certainty that I take to underlie STEM(B), I will turn to Michel Henry’s account of barbarism as a genuine threat to philosophy, and life itself. Having set up the contemporary problem via Henry, I will propose a possible response to it by sketching an account of existential determination drawn from Søren Kierkegaard’s Discourse, “The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air.” What we will see in Kierkegaard, and I will attempt to expand to philosophical living more broadly, is that trust, hope, and risk are definitive of existence in ways that require us to stand firmly while also recognizing that there are always other places that one could (legitimately) stand.
