ABSTRACT
This chapter examines nuanced accounts of belief that attempt to make better sense of the appearance of dual belief or the irrationality distinctive of self-deception. It considers revisionary accounts of the motives for self-deception. Some of the proposals are better thought of as revising belief or intention rather than as sacrificing them. In particular, there are those who argue that the motives for self-deception can lie outside the psychology of the self-deceived, driven by biological forces or the intentions of others. Revisionary accounts that appeal to subpersonal states and processes gain plausibility because self-deception, as a failure of rationality, resists handy explanation in terms of intentional action and outright belief. The logic of self-deception has been studied from the perspectives of many different disciplines: Philosophy, psychology, biology, and even economics have all contributed. The models and logics offered from these various disciplines can all be used to support specific psychological mechanisms and functions for self-deception.
