ABSTRACT

Philosophers have pretty exhaustively mapped the theoretical problems of self-deception and the possible responses that one can give to them from the armchair. There is only so much that can be done with folk psychological theorizing in terms of beliefs, desires, and centers of agency. Rather than focusing on analyzing self-deception and explaining how it is possible, upcoming research should continue or commence the task of explaining how it is psychologically implemented, identifying its common forms in real life, assessing it and recommending corrective measures, and weighing its epistemic costs against various benefits. Philosophers should always have an interest in identifying irrationality and explaining its limits. Twentieth-Century philosophy of mind has established the orthodoxy that belief is governed, or at least strongly limited, by oftentimes holistic considerations of rationality and meaning. Responsibility for self-deception arises in the law when it comes to willful blindness, culpable ignorance, and neglect.