ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to understand the relation between expectation and experience. It takes up two challenges from predictive processing that aim to show that sensorimotor enactivism implies an internalist, brain-bound theory of the realisers of phenomenal consciousness. Sensorimotor enactivists argue that phenomenal experience of the world is mediated by sensorimotor understanding. But this causes difficulties for any argument from the sensorimotor theory to extended consciousness. It can now be argued that sensorimotor understanding is locally realised in the brain of an individual. Sensorimotor understanding underwrites one form of expectation that is important for making possible experience of the world. Sensorimotor enactivism, as we are developing the view, holds that there are many other forms of expectation that also play important roles in shaping what we experience. Assigning high precision to expectations at these higher levels of sensory processing leads to an alignment of expectations among people taking part in a practice.
