ABSTRACT
According to an important family of approaches, memory seemings justify propositional memory judgments. Yet, these approaches lead to insurmountable problems. As a result, many contemporary accounts of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue. I start by contrasting episodic with propositional memory: episodic memory preserves acquaintance, whereas propositional memory preserves thought contents. Next, I draw attention to the contrast between propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering explains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I adopt an account of this attitude in terms of feelings of familiarity. I then revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are justified by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by drawing a general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes and contents.
