ABSTRACT
This chapter poses a challenge to the use of intuitions as evidence in both mentalist and extra-mentalist projects. It considers two sorts of responses to that challenge. The first focuses on the alleged expertise of professional philosophers. The second proposes more restrictive accounts of philosophical intuition. The chapter reviewed a number of studies indicating that a substantial list of philosophical intuitions vary across demographic groups. And that they are influenced by a number of prima facie irrelevant factors, ranging from language and order of presentation to smells, fonts, and funny video clips. Experimental philosophers typically collect data about the intuitions of students in classrooms, or internet users, or people in public places. In a few studies, data have been collected from indigenous people in remote corners of the world. Implicit or tacit theories are another, closely related, target of mentalist philosophical analyses. The problem that these findings pose for philosophers who use intuitions as evidence for extra-mentalist theories is obvious.
