ABSTRACT
The early days of the 1987 intifada witnessed the foundation of a new Palestinian political organization: Hamas, Harakat al-Muqawamma al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas’ declared objective was to drive Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza as the first step in a struggle to establish an Islamic Palestinian state through a dual-track strategy combining subversion, civil resistance and terrorism.
This chapter shows that overall, in the course of the intifada, Israel proved effective in fighting against Hamas, slowly but gradually adapting at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. In fact, the IDF successfully managed to transform its organizational structures and operating patterns, introducing police-style riot-control techniques and equipment and deploying non-military measures to control the civilian population. Military force was employed within a broader framework combining all the tools of national power aimed at driving a wedge between Hamas and its constituency through interaction of persuasion and coercion. Finally, by moving towards a new political order in the Territories, Israel denied Hamas’ strategic goals and delegitimized the movement among the strategic “center of gravity” represented by the Palestinian population.
