ABSTRACT
Between 2007 and 2014, Hamas developed its force structure, tactics and operational concept with the aim of “bleeding” the Jewish state through rocket fire and tunnel incursions. Israel conducted three campaigns aimed at militarily weakening and politically isolating the Islamic Resistance Movement. Analyzing each of them, the chapter shows that Israel proved ultimately effective, achieving after each operation an almost immediate decline in rocket fire, denying Hamas’ strategic aims and inflicting more damage than the movement was able to cause.
At the tactical level, the IDF did not entirely successfully adapt. Quick fixes to address Hamas’ tactical innovations were rapidly developed and deployed, but not stably translated into more comprehensive tactical solutions. At the operational level, though slowly, the IDF adapted, introducing considerable improvements introduced in the operational design and planning of “deterrence-driven operation” as well as effectively integrating defense in its operational pattern. At the strategic level, to a limited extent, Israel adapted, becoming more proficient in building international support for its Gaza operations and skillfully taking advantage of security cooperation with Egypt to keep Hamas politically isolated.
