ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book. The book analyses the 30 years of conflict between Israel and Hamas that shows the impact of material factors, a distinct and lasting influence of cultural factors on Israel's adaptation process. In the Israeli conception and practice, the tactical requirements of systematically disrupting and weakening the enemy infrastructure were integrated within an operational framework aimed at deterring the Islamic Resistance Movement and driving a wedge between it and its constituencies through a systematic use of coercion. The 'original' IDF operational concept, centered on the offensive maneuver of ground forces, proved totally irrelevant in LIC in 1987. In the course of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel conducted a harsh counterinsurgency campaign combining coercive military measures vis-a-vis the civilian population with a relentless attack against the military infrastructure of Hamas. Israel's approach to the conflict with Hamas was inhibited by the Islamic organization's ideology.
