ABSTRACT
This chapter approaches Spinoza's conceptualization of law as something that is inseparable from his metaphysics, psychology, moral theory and ethics. It focuses on how Spinoza through the concept of law, on the one hand, ties the function of civil society with nature, and, on the other hand, ties the achievement of ethical wellbeing and virtue with an external measurement of morality. It presents function to enable considered discussions of both Spinoza's conceptualization of the state and that of international law in the chapters to come. It explains how the freedom to philosophize relates to this aspect of Spinoza's definition of human-divine laws. The difference between human civil prescriptive laws and those laws that Spinoza calls human-divine laws is that while the first group is directed towards the preservation of the society formed by humans in order to live in peace and security, the second is directed towards achieving the human highest good individually.
