ABSTRACT
This chapter attempts to define what it means for cognition to be embodied. Within embodied cognition, F. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch’s The Embodied Mind is often regarded as an urtext. Many of its themes – disillusionment with cognitive science’s allegiance to computationalism, sympathy for Gibsonian and connectionist approaches to cognition, suspicion that the concept of representation has been overplayed in explanations of cognition, confidence that perception and cognition must be linked to action – have ascended to the status of dogma within embodied cognition. Esther Thelen’s pioneering application of dynamical systems theory to cognitive phenomena has earned her royal status in the embodied cognition community. Not only is the philosopher Andy Clark one of embodied cognition’s most eloquent and enthusiastic spokespersons, but his careful and cogent presentations of embodied cognition have also helped to shape and orient a number of research programs within embodied cognition.
