ABSTRACT
It is now conventional wisdom that the role and influence of the backbenchers in liberal democracies remain largely restricted. Rarely do they have much scope to initiate legislative proposals. Nor can they always modify measures proposed by others. What they are expected to do is to follow the lead of party leaders and abide by party directives. Party loyalty is undeniably a part of the transmitted image of the ‘good parliamentary member’ (Leuven, 1998). There are several factors that may encourage backbenchers to be loyal to the party. These range from ideological affinities and homogeneous social composition of members to their dependence upon party to achieve goals they choose to aspire to [such as] reselection, re-election, influence and decision-making, parliamentary or party office, good policy or even information and social status (Leuven, 1998). To be loyal to the party and its leadership is to expect some rewards that may not be forthcoming otherwise. Those seeking to follow policies and/or adopt strategies independently of the party are likely to risk serious problems.
