ABSTRACT
The concept of deterrence existed far back in history, but it is only in the twentieth century that it developed into a consciously and continuously articulated objective of high priority in strategic planning and diplomacy. In part this was because of the "permeability" of national security that came with the emergence of aerial warfare. Conceptual development never really progressed after the 1950s, so much as it travelled cyclically between the horns of old dilemmas. Careful conceptualization would distinguish between deterrence as the objective and choices in targeting doctrines as choices about the means, with the disputes over the latter being about which way to plan to fight the hypothetical war would most effectively underwrite deterrence. By 1980 the conceptual tilt among American strategic elites was in the direction of what might be called the Sovietization of doctrine–emphasis on the political and military functions of war plans as the best basis for deterrence.
