ABSTRACT
In Chapter One, I showed that Pannenberg's basic approach to theological anthropology stresses the importance o f his theological understanding o f humanity as exocentric being, called to a destiny. On the one hand, I shall argue that his use o f psychology is limited by this orientation, and to that extent, to be criticised. Thus he sees the intra-human relationship, the structure and function o f human consciousness as a key area, which he wishes to defend from reductionist philosophies. He does not examine the contributions o f psychology to the study o f inter-human relationships, or the cognitive psychologies dealing with change and development. On the other hand, his epistemological agenda, as indicated in Chapter Two, requires the establishment o f a hermeneutical-philosophical ground for concepts in psychology. It is especially important for him to deal with the problems raised by idealist conceptions of the self.1 His approach to this is a serious attempt to deal with the philosophical issues behind the concept o f human identity in postmodemity, and is unrivalled in contemporary theology. Not surprisingly, therefore, his theological engagement with psychology is very different from other contemporary approaches, whether Continental or Anglo-Saxon. Examples such as those o f Moltmann (1974) or, for an English example, McFadyen (1990) show much less o f an apologetic intent at the philosophical level, and much more o f a creative interaction with the political and social, as well as an awareness o f contemporary practical psychology. In contrast, Pannenberg devotes enormous effort to a very thorough philosophical grounding of the concepts o f self, ego and self-consciousness, and does not deal with the psychology o f human social relationships at all. His choice of psychological theory reflects this.
