ABSTRACT
This chapter shows the multiple relation theory of judgment (MRTJ) can do a good job generating explanations of all the explananda that a theory of propositions should ideally provide, whilst avoiding the explananda that a theory of propositions needn't bother with. Explaining the explananda of a theory of propositions, without reifying propositions, is what warrants for the MRTJ, its renown, as a no-proposition theory of propositions. The chapter discusses the extent that MRTJ is supposed to be a no-proposition theory of propositions. The first traditional role that propositions are posited to play is to provide the information content for the utterance of a sentence. The next role that propositions are posited to play is that of objects to propositional attitudes. The most straightforward extension of the MRTJ was explored by C. D. Broad who – clearly aware of the similarity it bore to Russell's theory of judgement – called it the Multiple Relation Theory of Sensible Appearances (MRTA).
