ABSTRACT
Multiple relation theory of judgment (MRTJ) is motivated by the fact that explains all of the explananda that a theory of propositions really owes us. It does this without positing the existence of propositions, but without neglecting the explananda, as Davidsonian meaning theories do – and thus the MRTJ, despite its denial of propositional realism, really is a theory of propositions: a no-proposition theory of propositions. The representation-concern is a major motivating factor for certain theories of propositions, and seemingly ignored by others. The aboutness concern arises automatically for any view that doesn't answer the representation-concern. The chapter compares and contrasts the fate of MRTJ and its various competitors against the concerns. Ultimately, in the light of this comparison, the MRTJ is a strong contender in the race to unlock the metaphysics of meaning. Russell's ramified theory of types can look more or less ad hoc, as a solution to the Appendix-B paradox, depending upon one's background metaphysics.
