ABSTRACT
A number of recent power failures triggered by external causes is discussed from the perspective of resilience. In some cases (mostly overloads) the failures propagated widely although service was quickly restored. Other cases (e.g., winter storm Lothar and Emsland) show that it can take weeks to restore power. Evidence suggests that cascading events starting at one vulnerable location (caused by technological failure or terror attack) can propagate widely through a system. We shed light on the question of how system characteristics are changed by the Energiewende by considering the technical and social aspects of the system. To open a new means to achieve insights, we briefly compare the characteristics of the financial system with those of the power system. In finance, regulatory measures to maintain system stability and functionality compete continuously with the individual actions of large players to take advantage of the system, which can lead to failures as a result of the system’s internal dynamics. In contrast, there are currently no internal dynamics in the power system that can overwhelm the regulatory frame. The energy system is confronted, however, by a variety of socially and politically induced risks apart from purely technical ones.
