ABSTRACT
Minimally, modal primitivism is the view that modal idioms are up neither for elimination nor for reduction to non-modal bases. This chapter distinguishes the position which conjoins these two theses by the term 'rigid actualism'. It examines the problem of modal knowledge, outlining how eliminativism and reductionism are aligned with distinct forms of epistemological concern. The chapter proceeds to provide an epistemology for metaphysical modality de re which, although different from Kripke's account in some important respects, is of a broadly Kripkean form. It argues that anti-realist positions concerning necessity, essence and individuation are committed to an untenable and epistemologically bankrupt metaphysic. The problem for Armstrong's account which is at issue, relating to the modal status of the contents of the theory and of the reductive equivalences it must posit, is not one of ontology, but of conceptual priority.
