ABSTRACT
T he problem to be briefly touched on here seems to have been so tar denied the attention it deserves. If a person's attitude or state of mind is to count as moral, what kind of formal structure must it have? What more can be said about the object of moral-mindedness, and how does an aberrant intention differ from a completely approvable one? Thus my theme is neither the material contents of moral conduct, nor the manner in which a materially "good will" is expressed in particular varieties of the moral attitude. I am concerned with the make-up of the "good will" itself, concentrating entirely on the way it relates to the concept or ideal of "the good" or "the moral" as such. In actual fact we should not speak of the "good will" (a much too confined and misleading term) but of the "moral intention". This expression picks out what is essential - the central point of the attitude or the conduct, and the elements of willing, shades of feeling and presupposed beliefs that surround it.
