ABSTRACT
Introduction: The Central Questions Revisited As laid out in Chapter One, four clusters of questions have formed the point of departure for this study: first, using air pollution politics and policies from the 1980s and early 1990s as a rough comparative benchmark, how can a closer, separate scrutiny of central and recent EU and CLRTAP policy outcomes substantiate the impression of a substantial strengthening of policy over time, thinking in terms of both political and environmental indicators of strength?Second, assuming that such a policy strengthening has taken place within the two contexts, which factors can best shed light on this development? Given that the further development of abatement measures were becoming increasingly expensive and environmental concern was on the decrease again, and hence important issue characteristics did not favour policy strengthening, it became natural to focus attention on several interesting institutional changes in terms of membership and decision-making procedures within both contexts. For instance, in the EU context, an interesting increase in the opportunity for majority voting took place in the 1990s. Moreover, three relatively green new Member States were added to the EU in 1995; their accession possibly influencing the operation of all major EU institutions. Within the CLRTAP context, regime-induced improvement in the knowledge of the interplay of pollutants and their effects has paved the way for a new, broader and a potentially more integrative decision-making approach.Third, adopting a comparative perspective, when directly comparing the emission ceilings in the CLRTAP Protocol and the parallel EU NEC Directive, the EU ceilings are overall somewhat more ambitious. Given the fact that the problems addressed by both institutions are quite similar, this provides a good opportunity to scrutinise the impact of several institutional differences between the EU and CLRTAP. Given the wide-spread percep
tion of the EU as a considerably stronger institution than traditional regimes, why are the differences in strength still so moderate?Fourth, on the basis of the foregoing, what are the prospects for crucially important successful implementation of recent policies within the EU and CLRTAP, and what are the future institutional implications of the increasing interplay and parallel policy-making witnessed within the two contexts throughout the 1990s? Will the EU ‘take over’ and CLRTAP fade away?In the next section of this chapter, main findings in relation to the three first clusters of questions will be provided. The third and fourth sections will then look at perspectives ahead. How CLRTAP and the EU have Contributed Significantly to ‘Clearing the Air’ in the 1990s Let us first sum up the most important findings, before winding up this section with a discussion of some limitations related to the analytical framework applied in this study. Substantially stronger policies, but still not strong enough Even a rather crude comparative venture like the one carried out in this context reveals that policy strength has increased substantially both within the EU and CLRTAP contexts - most conspicuously in terms of ambitiousness and ‘behavioural bite’. Within the EU context, national emission ceilings for EU countries codified within the CLRTAP context have been replaced by ceilings codified within the EU institutional structure; flat rate reductions have been replaced by a complex net of differentiated commitments; new substances such as ammonia have been drawn into the regulatory picture; and emission targets have generally been tightened. The implication of this development is that the gap between adopted policies and ‘acceptable’ emission levels has been substantially reduced. However, current policies even faithfully implemented, will still leave a significant gap in 2010.Within CLRTAP, the agreed emission cuts of both S02, NOx and VOCs are considerably more ambitious than earlier CLRTAP commitments. Moreover, including ammonia means that an important first step has been taken also within CLRTAP in closing what has been referred to as a regulatory gap in European air pollution policy. The overall implication of this development is that the gap to environment-friendly emissions levels
has been substantially reduced. But like the case within the EU context, current policies will still leave a significant gap in 2010. Hence, an overall score in terms of the development of policy strength within both contexts would be something like ‘substantially stronger, but still not strong enough’. Shedding light upon CLRTAP developments: The integrative multipollutant approach - and a greener UK In order to shed light upon the strengthening of policy, prime and initial emphasis was put on more fundamental institutional changes having taken place within the two contexts related to membership, decision-making procedures and interplay with other institutions. A rough comparison with CLRTAP as an institution during the NOx negotiations a decade earlier reveals both similarities and differences. On one hand, the basic functioning of the institution was quite similar. Both processes functioned on the basis of a consensus principle, and both processes developed on the basis of a close science-politics dialogue.On the other hand, Chapter Two drew attention to three potentially important institutional developments: First, in terms of membership, the break-up of the old Soviet bloc and the changes in Eastern Europe were focused upon. It was suggested that these changes have made CLRTAP parties more homogenous and led to more East-West coalition building. Combined with the ‘pulling-effect’ of the EU accession process, this may have led to more constructive CLRTAP decision-making and possibly contributed to increasing CLRTAP policy strength.With regard to the first element here, there seems to be widespread consensus on the notion that the general decision-making atmosphere has certainly become more open and relaxed than in the old Cold War days. In this context, it was noted that a Trust Fund for Assistance to Countries in Transition (TFACT) established by the Executive Body in 1994, contributed to wide participation in the negotiations. However, these generally positive developments seem to have had very little effect on the main positions adopted in the negotiations. Moreover, given the enlargement process within the EU, one might have expected greater negotiation flexibility and more progressive positions in primary EU candidates such as Poland and Hungary. At least with regard to Poland, this does not seem to hold true. All in all, although the general development of the East-West negotiating atmosphere seems to have been captured well by this proposition, the anticipated effects on positions did not follow suit.
