ABSTRACT
This chapter outlines the deep motivation and constraints that face those who advocate a form of 'justice as impartiality'. It raises two doubts about the very possibility of finding a widely accepted notion of 'the reasonable'. The chapter attempts to circumvent these problems by locating such a notion in a particular context with three specific roles. Firstly, as a criterion of exclusion and inclusion and secondly, as a justificatory yardstick to replace divisive and conflicting claims to the truth. Thirdly, as the moral basis for citizens to engage in social cooperation, so that there can be civility within conflict. This normative dimension is important for political liberalism's long term stability and is what distinguishes it from a political accommodation of pluralism based on a mere modus vivendi. Concept of democracy entails both a recognised procedure and a set of substantive values in its preconditions, implications and rationale. It concludes by acknowledging the limits and advantages of this account of reasonableness.
