ABSTRACT
Two further conceptual lines of argumentare discussed in Chapter 8. The first of an argument is from pluralism to the institutions of liberal-democratic constitutionalism. Berlin has been criticized by Waldron for neglecting institutions. I defend Berlin against Waldron’s criticism and go on to show how value pluralism can form the basis of a case for constitutional institutions much like those commended by Waldron. However, pluralists should disagree with Waldron’s rejection of judicial review of legislation. There is a conceptual link between pluralism and judicial review on the basis of value diversity: the courts represent a different set of values from those embodied by legislatures; pluralist approach would suggest a balance between the two. The other connection drawn by the chapter is between pluralism and three standard devices of public policy formation and advice. Cycling, firewalls, and casuistry are identified by David Thacher and Martin Rein as different means of managing conflicts among incommensurable values at a policy level. I link these three practices with approaches discussed earlier in the book and assess their strengths and weaknesses from a pluralist point of view.
