ABSTRACT
The conceptual version of the other minds problem has affinities with venerable idealist doctrines. This chapter reviews the major features of B. Brewer's approach to his contribution to this volume, 'Emotion and Other Minds'. Brewer identifies the core assumptions that can be traced to Berkeley's doorstep, since his own tactic parallels that of Locke's reply to the bishop. He reminds us that after attacking the very idea of abstract ideas, Berkeley advocated the strong empiricist claim that the sole source of our conception, or idea, of any given thing must be bound up, sometimes in complex ways, with our ability to perceive it. Nevertheless, for some, Berkeley's approach is still attractive as a means of understanding the nature of experience. The upshot is that the conceptual problem of other minds dissipates if one abandons the idea that one may start life with well-defined notions of self and other of the sort an adult philosopher commands.
