ABSTRACT
This chapter argues for two interrelated themes, such as, that there are important constitutive connections between emotions and values, and that there are important epistemological connections between them, To show the constitutive connections, it shows how emotions might seem external to values: by only 'pointing to' them, or by being only useful for them, or by being only added flourishes to them. The chapter also shows how emotions are internal to value, in fact so internal that they are inseparable from it or are even forms of it. Emotions have been seen as being useful in other ways, too—ways which, if they do not deny, do not accord, deep and intrinsic evaluative importance to emotions. The chapter focuses on some claims made by various psychoanalysts about connections between emotions and values and evaluations. There are other, more internal ways emotions are important for justice and for areas of value conceived of in terms of justice.
