ABSTRACT

This chapter looks briefly at the different theoretical lenses used to explain the outcomes of intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). It reviews the 'activities' of various influential actors during the IGC leading to the Amsterdam Treaty (ToA). In general, intergovernmentalist approaches score better in explaining the outcome of IGCs than competing approaches, which draw on supranationalist reasoning. The chapter looks at a selection of supranationalist explanations before turning to state-centric approaches. Scholarly work on IGCs is largely preoccupied with the influence of supranational actors. Particular attention will be paid to the preferences of the most important member states and the Commission entering the IGC. The rules of the IGC games are institutionally clear-cut, therefore bargaining among states on mandating supranational institutions can be best analyzed within a principal-agent framework. Historical institutionalism is clearly marginal when explaining IGC outcomes. The chapter ends with an initial assessment of the Nice Treaty.