ABSTRACT

This title was first published in 2003.Investigating the impact of federal structure on fiscal policy-making in four country cases, this book answers the question as to what extent federal structures hinder or, on the contrary, enhance a state's decision and co-ordination capacity in the field of fiscal policy. It questions the common assumption that federal structures restrain the co-ordination and hence macroeconomic management capacity. Well-documented and meticulously presented, this book will be useful for all those working in the field of policy research, and more generally for those who wish not only to attain a deeper and more comprehensive view on fiscal policy making or federalism, but on the territorial dimension of fiscal policy.

part 1|63 pages

Federal Fiscal Constitution and Intergovernmental Relationships

chapter 1|13 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|22 pages

Federal Fiscal Constitutions

chapter 3|26 pages

Intergovernmental Relationships

part 2|116 pages

Fiscal Policy-Making

chapter 4|18 pages

Fiscal Policy-Making in Canada

chapter 5|16 pages

Fiscal Policy-Making in Germany

chapter 6|22 pages

Contrasted Cases: Canada and Germany

chapter 7|29 pages

Fiscal Policy-Making in Belgium

chapter 8|28 pages

Fiscal Policy-Making in Switzerland

part 3|23 pages

Conclusions