ABSTRACT
Reasons are the tools of judging, for with reasons judges resolve issues and justify decisions. This chapter identifies substantive reasons as one of several types of reasons that judges give in common-law cases. The structure of the justification in even a seemingly simple common-law case may be complex in several ways. Judges who understand this complexity will not be as likely to misinterpret or misapply precedent. A specific theory of the nature and role of substantive reasons must form the core of a comprehensive theory of common-law justification. One form of skepticism about rightness reasons apparently rests on the view that such reasons are inevitably conclusory or question-begging. A conclusory or question-begging reason merely characterizes the decision to be justified, or restates some point in issue along the way to the decision. Thus, the theory of common-law justification serves not only as a descriptive account, but also as a justification of the common law itself.
