ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on analytical jurisprudence and gives some concrete illustrations of what a revived analytical jurisprudence might be like. Many commentators, including some of the most sensible, doubt the value of spending time or energy on defining or mapping jurisprudence as a field of study. The old nineteenth century usage of the term 'General Jurisprudence' is broader and more flexible than 'global' just because it refers to discourse about two or more jurisdictions or legal orders from the micro-comparative to the universal. Julius Stone lamented the marginalisation of historical and sociological jurisprudence, the almost total neglect of the quest for justice. In discussing sociological jurisprudence Stone originally limited the phrase to 'observing and generalizing upon the effect of law upon men and men upon law'. Stone's contemporary, Herbert Hart, has sometimes been treated as equating analytical jurisprudence with 'linguistic analysis', or with elucidation of abstract concepts.
