ABSTRACT
One of the most striking differences between the early and later Leibniz is his characterization of substance and the system of nature. While divine action as an explanation of natural phenomena is not infrequent in the early writings, it is unexpected after the Discours de meta physique of 1686 when he begins placing strong emphasis 00 the autonomy of nature and the substances within it. Yet such explanations are found in the later writings, presenting the appearance of an internal tension in Leiboiz's system. The later Leibniz strongly emphasizes the autonomy of nature, which goes without need of mending or extraordinary intervention of God. Yet he also insists on transcreation and the attribution of increases in creaturely perfection to God. Outwardly the former claims of nature's autonomy would seem to be in conflict with the latter emphasis on creatural dependency. Robert Sleigh Jr. has acknowledged this apparent tension between Leibniz's metaphysical and theological exposition of creaturely action (Sleigh 1990, 184 f.) . For this reason, Catherine Wilson has understood Leibniz's mentions of emanation and continuous creation as vestiges of a prior Occasionalism (Wilson 1989, 166-168). In what follows I will argue that Leibniz's expositions of continuous creation and divine emanation are in fact central to his mature account of created substance and his opposition to Occasionalism. I will show that the tension between Leibniz's emphasis on creatural autonomy and creatural dependency appears only on the outward edges of his system and that it disappears when placed within the context of his full account of divine causation. I shall contend further that this context includes a weIl-established tradition of Christianiz~d Neoplatonism in which creatural autonomy is grounded in God's emanative causality.
