ABSTRACT
The larger philosophical issue in this book is nested concerns the nature of the freedom condition for moral responsibility. The book discusses Frankfurt’s argument. Here are five implications that would follow from the soundness of Frankfurt’s argument. First, it would affect both the compatibilists and incompatibilists’ understanding of the sort of freedom pertinent to moral responsibility. Second, the success of Frankfurt’s argument would undercut a classical argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism employed by many incompatibilists, an argument that rests crucially on principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Third, some in the literature take the dialectical situation between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists to shift under the assumption that Frankfurt’s argument is sound. Fourth, without PAP, a compatibilist can grant premise in the argument for incompatibilism. Finally, there is also an important implication for the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book.
