ABSTRACT
Traditional libertarians argues that determinism precludes free action by, for example, precluding an agent’s being ultimately responsible for anything. Some compatibilist believers in free action argue that libertarians rely on indeterminism in a way that deprives us of freedom-level control over our decisions. Drawing partly on some attractions of soft libertarianism and on a libertarian approach articulated in R. MeleAlfred to accommodating successful Frankfurt-style cases. On the assumption that some Frankfurt-style cases undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities PAP and PAPf, a libertarian who holds that the only truth about determinism that precludes moral responsibility and freedom is that determinism is incon-sistent with there being robust alternative possibilities is stuck with an untenable position. However, Fischer argues that any alternative possibilities left open in a representative Frankfurt-style case – that is, nonrobust alternative possibilities, or flickers of freedom – are simply not sufficiently robust to ground our ascriptions of moral responsibility.
