ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author assumes a general knowledge of Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs). FSCs were introduced to undermine ‘the principle of alternative possibilities’ or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise. The author defends that objection against their well-known counterexample and counterexamples of similar kinds. He tries to vindicate the intuitive belief that some APs are indeed necessary for moral responsibility and free will. Here is his original statement of what they call ‘the Kane/Widerker line of objection’ in his book Free Will and Values: Of late there has been a controversy inspired by Frankfurt about whether moral responsibility for an action implies the power to do otherwise. Mele and Robb’s much-discusses counterexample to the Kane/Widerker line of objection first appeared in their 1998 paper Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases.
