ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author presents a counterexample to what Harry Frankfurt dubbed ‘the principle of alternate possibilities’ (PAP). A Frankfurt-style case is designed to undermine PAP by presenting an agent in an ‘IRR-situation,’ the kind of situation described in the following principle: IRR: There may be circumstances in which a person performs some action which although they make it impossible for him to avoid performing that action, they in no way bring it about that he performs it. Because of these ‘circumstances,’ an agent in an IRR-situation could not have done otherwise than he did, but the circumstances do not cause the agent to act. In Mele and Robb, the author constructed a Frankfurt-style case that avoids the Kane/Widerker line of objection. Some philosophers have objected that blockage defeats the purpose of a Frankfurt-style case. In order for a Frankfurt-style case to present a genuine IRR-situation and be effective.
