ABSTRACT
Sellars rejects the idea that the moral ought can reside in the consequent of a hypothetical imperative, such as “If you intend E, then you ought to do A.” Following Jean Hampton, Joseph Heath, Christine Korsgaard, and others, I argue that all reasoning cannot be reduced to instrumental reasoning; Sellars is correct that we need a substantive account of what ends are intrinsically reasonable. However, we can see that many attempts to “ground” morality are motivated by moral foundationalism—by the “Given” transposed to the practical sphere—particularly when these attempts demand that morality be grounded in nonmoral reasons and given a “noncircular” justification. Our anti-foundationalist, anti-Given argument will demonstrate that the latter demand simply cannot be met in any justificatory enterprise—be it epistemology, morality, or what have you—and we should not hold practical reason up to this impossible standard. Just as Sellars rejects the Given in epistemology, so should the Sellarsian reject the Given in practical reasoning.
