Material Practical Inference

Sellars presents practical reasoning as based on nomologicals of the form “Doing A_i if C_j is causally necessary to the realization of E_k” (Science and Metaphysics 7.VIII.§51/p. 195). This, however, misrepresents practical reasoning, as there is often more than one way of achieving an end; hence, the performance of no one means is in general a necessary condition on the achievement of one’s end. In this chapter, I introduce the notion of a material inference, which is central to Sellars’s philosophical project, and argue that the notion of a material practical inference gives us a more flexible model of practical reasoning. This, combined with Bratman’s notion of intentions as elements of partial plans, allows us to develop an account of practical reasoning that (a) more accurately represents practical reasoning (and the role of intention in practical reasoning) than does Sellars’s original, extremely rigid nomological-based model, and (b) is consistent with other elements of Sellars’s philosophy (such as his views on theoretical or causal-explanatory material inference and on the role and status of desires).