ABSTRACT
The author takes up the question of the determinist's claim that the libertarian was rejecting the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The usual use of the Principle, after all, has been with reference not primarily to freewill but to ultimate metaphysical issues. Philosophers have employed it to argue, for example, to a necessary being on which all contingent being is dependent. To make the connection between libertarianism, determinism and ultimacy the author relates the notion of ultimacy, which is so closely bound up with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, to the notion of logical completeness. The author's rejection of phenomenological determinism turned, in effect, on the contention that a logically complete reason for an action is not of the sort the determinist requires. Participation in dialogue is not the same thing as lack of conviction. Participation is not even the same as openness to new truth, though it is certainly far closer to it.
