ABSTRACT
Determinism has often been defined as the assertion that all events, including actions, are in principle predictable with complete precision and certainty. This chapter examines the argument about unpredictability. It further examines the scope and nature of predictability which would be compatible with a libertarian view. Discussion leads easily to confusion for at least two reasons. First, there is an intimate but complex relation between the notions of predictability and explicability. The second reason arises from the complexities of the notion of freedom. All prediction, as opposed to guesswork, depends on uniformity-statements. The elements which are indeterminate relative to any body of knowledge are really so in any sense which would conflict with what the determinist wishes to say. In the case of freewill the relevant indeterminism relates to human action. And the position would seem to be that macro-patterns, relative to a human being, are almost or entirely irrelevant, while micro-patterns are decisive.
