ABSTRACT
What does it mean to say that something is a morally relevant potential person though? It is unproblematic to say that an actual person is a morally relevant being, but why should a potential person, a being that does not yet have the valued capacities of an actual person, be morally relevant? One plausible answer to this question revolves around the issue of identity. To put it very simply, an argument from potential generally amounts to the claim that a potential person and the actual person it becomes are the very same being, and that consequently the potential person already has within it something of great moral value, which will become manifest if the potential person continues its process of development. Of course, on one level, that of numerical identity, the foetus that is a potential person is obviously the very same being as the person it becomes. This truism, however, can tell us little of moral consequence. More important is whether there is another more significant sense in which the foetus and the person it becomes share their identity. We will begin our investigation into this possibility with a look at a popular theory of identity. We will then go on to apply this theory of identity to the foetus and person it becomes, in order to determine whether there is a morally significant relationship between them; and whether that relationship is sufficient to grant the post24-week-old foetus rights that are normally attributable only to actual persons.
