ABSTRACT
The second dimension of autonomy is self-realisation. While self-definition was concerned with the commitments the agent takes on within the domain of personal identity, self-realisation is concerned with the commitments the agent takes on within the domain of practical agency. External self-realisation is concerned with the connection between intending and acting. The bootstrapping objection focuses on the purported normativity of intentions. The next objection to consider does not necessarily deny the normativity of intentions, but rather objects to making it a requirement of autonomy that an agent's actions fulfil their intentions. There are two distinct versions of this objection, both of which focus on the externalism that this strand of self-realisation introduces. The first is that excluding external conditions is necessary to maintain the conceptual distinction between autonomy and freedom. The second is that the inclusion of an externalist condition has the counterintuitive implication that we are only autonomous when our actions are successful.
