ABSTRACT
The assassination of Rasputin had ended the inertia. By the end of February 1917 the Tsar decided to discuss terms of peace with Austria. Early in March, socialist groups in Russia, still debating whether strikes and insurrections were premature, were warning against police provocations. The allies knew that there existed no military reason that would justify Russia's quitting the war: both army morale and war production had been improving. There were good reasons for the Tsar to fear a separate peace which might lead to uprisings and also might deliver him to the mercies of his cousin, Wilhelm II. There is evidence which indicates that the Tsar opposed a separate peace. It is unlikely that the Tsar feared a socialist insurrection. The abduction of Komisarov was not the only or even the primary cause of the provocation failure. The tactics planned by the police were inept; the intended employment of machine guns from predetermined fixed positions was especially faulty.
