ABSTRACT
Max Weber, an early and influential sociologist, started his major treatise “The Sociology of Religion” (1978) by noting that the term “religion” cannot be defined at the beginning of a study, but only after one’s research is complete. He then proceeded to write more than five books on the subject, but never achieved enough clarity or completion to reach a definition. “Religion,” it turns out, is a tricky word. This chapter does not attempt to do what Weber neglected, and will not
offer a single, authoritative definition. Instead, it will explore the range of ways in which this tricky word is used by a variety of scholars in order to prepare the way for critical thinking about religion and ecology. We will investigate a series of different approaches – various ways religion is defined, studied, and critiqued – and pay particular attention to the debates and tensions inherent in these choices. The overarching question is: who gets to decide what religion is and who and what gets left out of each approach to religion? While the focus here is on the ways scholars think about the word “religion,”
our most important argument is that careful thought about this term and the reality it represents does not just matter in classrooms and books, but is important to many people’s lives. Religion has shaped human cultures, and through them has shaped the entire planet on which we live. Religion is deeply and personally important to billions of people on the planet, and religious institutions play instrumental roles in most people’s lives in the world today. Religion literally changes the bodies and minds of human beings; through those people and the institutions of which they are a part, religion changes the atmosphere and the landscape of the entire planet. What “religion” is and how it functions in the lives of human beings and in cultural institutions matters deeply. While religion matters, it is important not to assume too much about it.
The term itself has its origins in Latin, and so emerges from western history and carries western baggage. In other words, when we talk about religion we are having a discussion with parameters set in a particular, largely European, cultural context; we should not pretend that all the assumptions made in such a discussion will apply to all cultures. For example, we think of traditions like
Japanese Shinto and Indian Hinduism as “religions” because of a western classification system that has been globalized by economic and cultural colonization. Shinto and Hinduism can helpfully be understood as religions, but we cannot assume that they will fulfill all the expectations westerners bring to that term. Many Hindus do not think of themselves as “Hindu” (itself a western term), but instead primarily affiliate with their geographic region of origin and its ritual traditions. Many practitioners of Shinto are also active Buddhists, and would not understand these two “religions” as demanding an either-or choice. In light of these complexities and in hopes of developing a view of religion
that is not applicable only in the West, the prominent contemporary scholar of religion Jonathan Z. Smith critiques lists of “world religions,” arguing that “It is impossible to escape the suspicion that a world religion is simply a religion like ours … that has achieved sufficient power and numbers to enter our history to form it, interact with it, or thwart it” (2004: 191-192). In this chapter and in this book, when we write about religion, we are not only referring to a list of world religions, but rather to components of what has historically been studied under the rubric of “religion.” This includes but is not limited to meaning-making practices, institutions, rituals, belief systems, sacred texts, moral norms, taboos, and even philosophical reflection upon religion as a whole. As will be clear the more you reflect on the definitions below, one can find “religion” in many phenomena and institutions that are rarely recognized as religions, one can find religious dimensions in many structures and systems which may not themselves be religions, and one can find practitioners of religions who are resolutely unorthodox in approaching their tradition.
