ABSTRACT
This chapter considers existing understandings of and approaches to proselytism in international human rights law, to show that it is not equally enjoyed as a manifestation of religion and belief by all rights-holders. It explores improper forms of proselytism –including threats or violence, and exposure to religious symbols, to show that certain forms of proselytism that should be considered improper, are instead permitted and protected as legitimate manifestations of certain religions. The chapter analyses circumstances in which proselytism as a manifestation of religion should be limited to equally protect non-believers and atheists alongside religious rights-holders. It relies on the framework offered by Tad Stahnke, it is argued that decisions as to whether proselytism should be limited, should be made on the basis of whether the proselytism undermines choice, rather than on the basis of the religion or belief of the proselytiser or his target. It is submitted that proselytism constitutes improper coercion where it interferes with freedom of choice.
