ABSTRACT
Some criticisms of public choice economics-which makes behavioral symmetry a foundational assumption-focus on the alleged inadequacy of rational choice theory. Plenty of empirical evidence indicates that people are not purely self-interested, so we should not model them as such. Political interventions designed to rein in the rich increase the value of political power relative to market power and thus perversely incentivize the rich to seek out political power. But maybe this concern is off the mark because markets encourage a competitive, greed is good mentality whereas democracies ask us to listen to each other, work together, and compromise for the common good. Voters need more than public-interested intentions if they are to promote the public good of good government; they need accurate beliefs about how to promote the public interest. The theory of expressive voting famously analogizes voting for your favorite candidate to cheering for your favorite team. Rawlsian ideal theory needs voters to promote the common good.
