ABSTRACT
Expressivism about any domain D is the view that statements that belong to D are properly understood not as fact-stating or representational but rather as expressive of some non-cognitive condition of the person making the statement. Almost everyone is an expressivist with regard to some domains. Emotivism and prescriptivism are odd doctrines, and so one might wonder what could motivate them. This chapter explores whether Pricean global expressivism is a viable pragmatist option. It discusses that Price's view invites troubling counterexamples that together occasion a pincer argument against global expressivism. On the one hand, the view seems to be too wide: there are cases where well-ordered disagreement is possible with regard to statements that are not truth-apt. On the other hand, the view looks too narrow: there are cases where there are truth-apt statements for which, at least at a time, there is no possibility for well-ordered disagreement.
