ABSTRACT
Pragmatism is fundamentally a metaphilosophical program according to which it is possible to devise a functional, effective, and philosophically defensible conception of inquiry—in advance of settling the thorny philosophical debates in metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory. Pragmatism resists the very idea of a First Philosophy. It refuses to adopt any view that proposes a blueprint for philosophy that identifies a hierarchy of issues, questions, and areas. The pragmatist denies that moral philosophy is subject to the veto of metaphysics even if it is conceded that morality is parasitic on the resolution of the freewill problem. Notice that the Mixed Bag thesis is a direct consequence of the No First Philosophy and No Veto theses, because in light of them we see that philosophy does not proceed from first principles. Progress, then, is measured by local advances on local philosophical problems, with the broader aim of synthesizing advances in multiple areas.
